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1 • SWIIIIIBry and Recommendations 
SWIIIIIBry 
1.01 The international markets for both cocoa and 
coffee have slumped during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Developing country producers have lost many billions of 
dollars from the price collapse. Producing countries in 
West Africa have been particularly hard hit as their 
economies depend on coffee and cocoa for foreign exchange 
and for employment for the rural population. 
1.02 Cote d'Ivoire and Togo have both suffered as a 
consequence of the world slump in coffee and cocoa prices. 
Cote d'Ivoire, the world's largest cocoa producer and one of 
the world's largest coffee producers, has lost billions of 
dollars in foreign exchange. So dramatic has the decline 
been that Cote d'Ivoire debt now trades on the secondary 
market for only 10% of face value. Toga, which depends on 
cocoa and coffee for 20% of its export earnings, has also 
suffered. 
1.03 The case for examining the beverage crop sectors 
on the Cote d'Ivoire and in Togo is based on the importance 
of the crops to their economies. In order to develop 
appropriate technologies, it is necessary for NRI to 
investigate the situation in those countries, like Togo and 
Cote d'Ivoire, where coffee and cocoa are important crops 
and where the world price falls are likely to have had a 
major impact. In terms of ODA development priorities, the 
cocoa and coffee industries of West Africa also deserve 
investigation as production is overwhelmingly a smallholder 
activity. It is, therefore, the smallholder who is one of 
the hardest hit by the price collapse. 
1.04 Output trends of coffee and cocoa in the two 
countries have diverged during the 1980s. Whereas on the 
Cote d'Ivoire the production of cocoa grew rapidly to 
surpass that of robusta coffee, in Toga the reverse 
occurred. On the Cote d'Ivoire the relative profitability 
of cocoa (linked closely to the natural production 
advantages for cocoa growing on the Cote d'Ivoire) 
encouraged the growth of cocoa output. In Toga, the success 
of the SRCC, an independent research and extension service, 
has lead to substantial growth in coffee output. 
1.05 In both countries, parastatal organisations have 
complete control over the marketing of coffee and cocoa. 
Grower prices and marketing margins are fixed each year, 
with the declared objective of ensuring fair and stable 
returns to the grower. In the 1970s and early to mid 1980s, 
these organisations generated immense surpluses by holding 
grower prices well below world price levels. These 
surpluses were used to finance public investment programmes. 
Today, the organisations are facing imminent demise. 
International development agencies insist that future 
assistance will be conditional on reform of the marketing 
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authorities. In particular, the pricing system is being 
questioned, with its inability to reward good quality and to 
penalise poor quality. 
1.06 On the Cote d'Ivoire, the cocoa sector appears to 
be healthy, in spite of low price levels. Production is 
competitive, with costs probably the lowest amongst the main 
producers. Research and development efforts are aimed at 
improving varieties and agronomic practices which will 
consolidate these strengths. Quality does not appear to be 
a major problem. Although Ivorian cocoa is not valued as 
highly by the market as is Ghana origin, prices are still 
relatively strong. Improvements in quality, including the 
more effective drying of the crop, present few technical 
problems, but, with a price structure which does not reward 
growers for the extra effort involved, there is no 
likelihood of quality improvements in the short term. 
1.07 The Ivorian coffee sector, by contrast, has been 
suffering from a declining quality reputation. The relative 
profitability of cocoa production discourages investment in 
coffee and, as figure 9 shows, yields have declined. 
Growers appear to have been putting in the minimum of effort 
to produce a generally poor quality product, with small bean 
size and disproportionately high levels of "black beans". 
Efforts to improve quality have floundered due to the 
inflexible pricing system of the Caisse de Stabilisation 
which has paid no premium for higher grade samples. In the 
current coffee season a premium will be paid for samples 
with lower proportions of black beans. However, critics 
regard these attempts as too marginal to have a major 
impact. Researchers and extension workers agree that there 
are no technical barriers to improving coffee quality, the 
problem lies with the pricing system. If growers could be 
assured of adequate recompense for their efforts, coffee 
quality would begin to improve very quickly. 
1.08 Togolese cocoa production benefits from many of 
the production advantages which makes Cote d'Ivoire so 
competitive; favourable climate, good infrastructure and 
good quality beans. In addition, the practice of certain 
Ghanaian production methods affords cocoa from Togo the same 
market premium which Ghanaian cocoa commands. However, the 
cocoa sector in Toga has declined steadily over the last 
fifteen years. Attempts at redeveloping the sector have 
been unsuccessful. This is believed to be partly a 
consequence of poor extension recommendations, and partly a 
result of the poor prices offered to growers. Whilst the 
problems with extension advice have now been remedied, 
further developments in the sector are conditional on the 
price level. As on the Cote d'Ivoire, little research work 
is being done on quality improvement. 
1.09 Production of robusta coffee in Toga has expanded 
substantially under the SRCC programme, to such an extent 
that output of coffee now exceeds that of cocoa. Toga 
robusta is valued by the market for its mildness and its 
good bean size (a function of the age of the new coffee) 
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and, to date, the efforts of SRCC seem to have prevented the 
kind of quality problems being faced on the Cote d'Ivoire. 
However, the poor outlook for robustas in the world coffee 
market and the current low prices threaten to dissuade the 
Togolese grower from the disciplined production regime which 
SRCC have encouraged. Mindful of this, IRCC Toga have been 
investigating ways of improving further the quality of 
robusta, including the use of wet processing techniques. 
These developments will come to nought if the price system 
does not change to accommodate the payment of premia for 
higher quality. 
Opportunities 
1.10 In Cote d'Ivoire, the opportunities for NRI appear 
at this stage to be limited. The issue of quality in 
Ivorian cocoa is one of consistency, which is the 
responsibility of the exporter. Since the exporter's 
margins are fixed by the state, there is little incentive to 
improve standards of sorting. The quality issue for Ivorian 
coffee also concerns pricing policy rather than specific 
technical advice. Substantial improvements in Ivorian cocoa 
and coffee output can be effected through changes in micro-
economic policy. Such changes are the sine qua non of 
improving Ivorian coffee and cocoa production. Additional 
technical measures, such as the use of black sheeting to 
accelerate drying, are marginal improvements in comparison 
with these policy changes. 
1.11 Opportunities are more interesting in Togo. Since 
Togo coffee and cocoa are already of relatively high 
quality, commanding market premiums over standard grades, 
the issue of quality is vital. Particularly in the case of 
coffee, research is being conducted on processes which will 
increase further the quality of the Togolese product. In 
such an atmosphere of marginal quality improvement, some of 
the basic research which NRI is conducting may be 
appropriate. Furthermore, IRCC has expressed an interest in 
co-operating with NRI. Lastly, with the likely withdrawal 
of World Bank money from the fourth phase of the SRCC 
project, IRCC are likely to be short of funds for research. 
This augers well for some form of NRI input. 
1.12 Basic research on coffee and cocoa quality is 
being conducted at IRCC laboratories in France and 
throughout West Africa. This work covers the adding of 
value through extraction of oil, chlorogenic acids and 
caffeine, and the identification of sulphur compounds 
implicated in the development of "stinkers" in roasted 
coffee. For cocoa, scientists have looked at the 
relationship between pyrazine content and chocolate aroma, 
the influence of enzyme addition on fermentation and the 
effect of partial extraction of pulp juice. Various 
mechanical innovations are also being considered to improve 
the quality and efficiency of pulping, fermentation, drying 
and so on. It will be important to develop links with IRCC 
headquarters in Paris if NRI decides to become involved in 
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cocoa and coffee quality research in order to avoid 
duplicating activities. 
Recommendations 
1.13 (Formal) contact should be established with IRCC 
headquarters in Paris and with key scientific staff at the 
chemistry and technology department of the CIRAD research 
centre at Montpellier. Current and planned work on cocoa 
and coffee quality improvement should be determined, and 
opportunities for liaison investigated. 
1.14 Conditional on 1.12 (above), and on the success of 
the current NRI basic research on the chemical variability 
of green bean coffee samples, contact should be made with 
IRCC, Togo in order to procure samples of washed and 
unwashed robusta for laboratory analysis in the UK. 
1.15 Possible future NRI participation in work on 
coffee and cocoa quality on the Cote d'Ivoire should be 
conditional on the reform of the marketing system. 
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2. World Market Situation 
Cocoa 
2.01 World cocoa supply has exceeded demand in the six 
consecutive cocoa seasons to 1989/90. Although consumption 
has been growing steadily, the scale of production growth 
(see figure 1) has been such that prices have fallen for the 
last seven years. In real terms, prices reached their 
lowest ever levels in 1989 (see figure 2). 
2.02 Most cocoa producing countries have increased 
their output of cocoa in the 1980s, but the most significant 
increases have come from Indonesia (16,000 to 120,000 
tonnes), Malaysia (60,000 to 250,000 tonnes) and Cote 
d'Ivoire (460,000 to 720,000 tonnes). In the face of this 
prodigious increase in output, the International Cocoa 
Organisation's (ICCO) attempts at price intervention were 
useless. In spite of accumulating a buffer stock of 250,000 
tonnes, the ICCO could not sustain world prices. By 
December 1990 total cocoa stocks had also reached record 
levels. 
2.03 With this combination of high production and 
stocks, recovery in the cocoa market is likely to be slow. 
Positive developments for a price recovery are likely to 
come from the high cost producers 1 who will be forced to cut 
back production where world prices fail to cover variable 
costs. On the demand side, consumption, particularly in the 
Far East, seems likely to continue to grow. These 
developments should produce a recovery from the historic 
lows of 1989 and 1990. 
2.04 The unknown factor in the world cocoa market is 
provided by Cote d'Ivoire, which produces over 30% of world 
supply. If, as is predicted by some analysts, Cote d'Ivoire 
decides to devalue then production could begin to accelerate 
again, postponing a price recovery. If, on the other hand, 
devaluation is not undertaken then output may continue to 
stagnate with a commensurate increase in prices. 
2.05 World beverage markets is notorious for its 
instability. Price peaks encourage the planting of new 
trees which, due to the nature of the crop, only start to 
yield after three to four years. As this new cocoa comes 
onto the market so prices begin to fall back, discouraging 
maintenance and replanting of the crop which leads to a 
lagged fall in output, in response to which prices will 
rise. The obvious solution is an effective international 
cocoa agreement. However, the history of international 
commodity agreements has been chequered, and the cases of 
both cocoa and coffee agreements demonstrate the difficulty 
of influencing world prices in the face of over-production. 
1) Particularly Malaysia and Brazil. 
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Coffee 
2.07 Coffee prices slumped in late 1989 with the ending 
of the ICO quota system. This system had failed to 
represent the demands of consuming members for high quality 
mild coffees and increasing numbers of buyers were forced to 
look outside the quota system for their supplies. As a 
result, a dual market emerged with non-quota sales being 
widely discounted. Finally, it became impossible to hold 
the agreement together and a "free market" was reestablished 
in July of 1989. 
2.08 The free market was characterised by exporters 
selling off vast stocks, assembled during the quota period2 • 
In response, coffee prices fell to record lows (see figure 
3). 
2.09 Recovery from this price level may be difficult. 
Relatively static coffee consumption, strongly influenced by 
health concerns 3 in the United States and Europe, means 
that, for the time being, changes in production hold the key 
to changes in the market situation. Lower than anticipated 
Brazilian output forecasts have prompted a slight recovery 
in the price of arabicas, and the temporary banning of 
exports from Brazil caused a flurry of buying. The robusta 
market, however, remains weak. As the relative price of 
arabica has fallen, blenders have been replacing robustas 
with arabicas, so demand for robusta has fallen. In the 
short term, active selling by robusta producers has pushed 
up stock levels in consuming countries and exerted further 
downwards pressure. As with cocoa, market recovery is 
likely to come from restructuring of world production where 
high cost producers gradually leave the market, reducing 
output and increasing price. 
2) ICO member countries had their share of the lucrative 
quota market determined by a formula based on past 
production and stock levels. Many countries accumulated 
unseasonably large stocks to increase their share of the 
global quota. 
3) This principally consists of concern over the effects 
of caffeine. 
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Country Studies 
3. Cote d'Ivoire 
3.01 Once the star performer of sub-Saharan economies, 
Cote d'Ivoire based economic growth on its commodity export 
sector. Major development of cocoa and coffee plantations 
coupled with systematic exploitation of forestry resources 
bought in large amounts of foreign exchange and helped to 
produce six to seven percent annual GDP growth rates in the 
1970s. During the early 1980s when weakening commodity 
prices and a severe drought reduced earnings from exports, 
the Ivorian growth rate declined. In the late 1980s and at 
the start of the 1990s, low and negative growth rates have 
re-occurred as commodity prices have dipped. 
3.02 With a currency tied to the French franc~, Cote 
d'Ivoire does not have the option to withstand world 
commodity price falls by devaluing. Thus, in comparison to 
growers in other West African countries such as Ghana and 
Nigeria, Ivorian growers are hit harder by world price 
falls. 
3.03 A characteristic of the Ivorian commodity sector 
is the role of the Caisse de Stabilisation5 • Acting as a 
form of marketing board, the Caisse sets a fixed price each 
growing season for major export crops. This price is 
supposed to guarantee the grower a "fair" return. Should 
there be any difference between the fixed price and the 
ruling world price, the Caisse will appropriate positive 
balances and subsidise negative balances. Substantial 
positive balances, such as those generated during the coffee 
and cocoa price peaks of the late 1970s, were used by the 
state to fund public investment programmes. 
3.04 The Caisse's objective is to guarantee a fair and 
stable revenue to cash crop producers throughout the season. 
This is achieved through setting an export price and making 
a series of fixed deductions' to arrive at a single producer 
price. This price is operative throughout the country; no 
allowance is made for differing transport charges. 
3.05 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Caisse 
extracted a considerable surplus through holding producer 
prices below prevailing world prices. From 1980 to 1987, £4 
4) 1 French franc = SO CFA. 
5) The Caisse is the "caisse de stabilisation et de 
soutien des prix des produits agricoles" (stabilisation and 
price support fund for agricultural products). 
6) Each year the Caisse sets a fixed CIF price for various 
commodities. From this price are deducted certain marketing 
charges. These charges, known as the "bareme" or 
"diff~rentiel", consist of fixed rates for collection, 
freight, reconditioning, etc. Further fixed deductions, the 
"hors bareme", are made for transport, costs of running the 
Caisse, subsidies for local processing ventures, etc. What 
is left is the grower price. 
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billion was transferred by the Caisse to the state from 
cocoa growers alone7 • In recent years, however, pressure has 
been applied for the payment to the grower of a higher 
proportion of the world price. 
3.06 The operations of the Caisse have been criticised 
by some observers for their unwieldiness in the face of 
rapidly changing market conditions. Certainly, the lack of 
a facility to pay premiums for good quality is a serious 
constraint to improving standards. The simplistic reduction 
of various fixed intermediate marketing charges (collection, 
reconditioning, packing, etc.) which has been undertaken to 
minimise the reduction in grower prices, has increased the 
incentive for buyers to defraud the grower. Furthermore, 
the costs of the Caisse reflect bureaucratic inefficiencies8 
and threaten to increase overall production costs. Reform 
of the Caisse is fundamental to further development of the 
Ivorian coffee and cocoa industries9 • 
3.07 Although the development of petroleum processing 
industries has helped to diversify the Ivorian economy in 
the l ast ten years , coffee and cocoa still represent almost 
half of total export earnings for the country. Thus the 
late 1980s coffee and cocoa price collapses have reduced 
export earnings by a considerable degree; for example, 1989 
cocoa earnings were 32% down on 1985 earnings10 in spite of 
exports having increased in quantity by 25%. The unfortunate 
co-incidence of cocoa and coffee price falls has served to 
exacerbate the problem. 
7) Competitivite du cacao Africain, CIRAD, 1990. 
8) CIRAD, 1990. op. cit. 
9) The recent sacking of the head of the Caisse is seen as 
the first move in reforming the organisation, something high 
on the list of priorities for both the IMF and the World 
Bank. 
10) Africa Analysis 117 8th March 1991 
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4. The Ivorian Cocoa Industry 
Production 
4.01 Cote d'Ivoire has around 700,000 cocoa growers 
operating on an area of approximately 2 million hectares. 
Cocoa holdings are typically small, with the majority (2/3) 
being less than 5 hectares. Output in the 1990/91 season is 
estimated at just over 700,000 tonnes 11 • Output has climbed 
steadily (see figure 4) since the start of the 1980s as a 
result of area expansion efforts, although recent record low 
prices have caused the cutback in output seen in the last 
two years. 
4.02 Though encouraged by the huge price rises in the 
late 1970s, the main driving force behind the increase in 
cocoa output was the unusual combination of production 
advantages which Cote d'Ivoire possesses, including: 
favourable climate, especially the timing of the dry 
season which coincides with the main cocoa harvesting 
season, improving drying after fermentation; 
relative availability of fertile lands, especially 
forest lands (although the supply is now declining); 
availability of labour; 
good phytosanitry conditions, resulting in low 
investment requirements for fungicides; 
young age structure of trees (two thirds under 15 years 
old); 
good infrastructure (roads) and relative political 
stability; 
intrinsic quality of Cote d'Ivoire beans. 
4.03 The combination of these advantages has made Cote 
d'Ivoire one of the world's most competitive cocoa 
producers, with the lowest costs of production of any major 
producer. CIRAD12 calculate production costs at around 120 
CFA per kilo for high yield enterprises (c. 500 kgs per 
hectare) and 140 CFA for low yield (c. 250 kgs per 
hectare) 13 • This compares with production costs 50% higher 
in Cameroon, 100% higher in Malaysia and 150% higher in 
Brazil. The main determinant of production costs on the 
Cote d'Ivoire is labour. Few capital inputs are used apart 
from some anti-capsid insecticides. 
4.04 The complex system of land ownership on the Cote 
d'Ivoire has tended to encourage growers to "over-produce" 
11) ICCO, 1990 
12) CIRAD, 1990. 
13) Using a daily 
underestimate. 
op. cit. 
wage rate of 1,000 CFA - possibly an 
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cocoa at a point where their daily earnings from the crop do 
not match alternative earning opportunities. Much of Cote 
d'Ivoire expansion in cash crops has been based on the 
encouragement of migrants, both internal and external, to 
farm forest lands. To attract migrants, the state offered 
ownership rights to forest land cleared for cash cropping, 
and in attempting to establish themselves in this alien 
environment, many of the migrants have worked beyond the 
strictly financial optimum to gain security through land 
ownership. 
4.05 The activities of the migrants in part explains 
the differing yields experienced in the country. In the 
south west, where migrants constitute 90% of cocoa growers, 
yields are around 660 kg/hectare, whilst in the south east, 
where native landowners dominate, yields only just clear the 
200 kg/hectare level. 
Marketing 
4.06 Due to favourable climatic conditions, growers on 
the Cote d'Ivoire tend to ferment and dry their own beans. 
The dry beans are collected from the growers by a network of 
buyers, each operating on behalf of an exporter. One sixth 
of these buyers work with the state-encouraged co-operatives 
which were introduced to free growers from the private 
buyers 14 • 
4.07 Private buyers do not only purchase beans, they 
also provide growers with chemical inputs and with credit. 
The provision of credit is particularly important for the 
rural population as their main cash expenditure - school 
fees - becomes due in September whilst the cocoa harvest 
does not begin until November. Effective interest rates for 
this credit, paid in cocoa beans, is thought to be high and 
fraud at this stage is common15 • 
4.08 Buyers have to submit their purchased beans to 
testing by Caisse staff at various collection centres 
throughout the country to verify moisture content and other 
quality dimensions. Once tested, the beans are delivered to 
the exporters. Only recognized and licensed exporters are 
allowed to export cocoa. Three quarters of total exports 
are handled by just four companies. In total, 16 companies 
handle the export of Cote d'Ivoire beans. Export quotas are 
allocated to each of the exporters. Often, these quotas are 
allocated on the basis of political patronage, although 
there is a secondary market in quotas which provides some 
impetus for improving efficiency within the industry. 
4.09 The traditional markets for Ivorian cocoa include 
the Netherlands, USA and Germany. In addition to selling 
14) Over half of private buyers are of Lebanese extraction, 
which apparently increased the popularity of the co-
operative policy amongst the indigenous population. 
15) CIRAD, 1990. op.cit. 
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cocoa beans, Cote d'Ivoire also sells cocoa products such as 
powder, butter and cake, usually manufactured from the 
second quality beans graded out by exporters. 
4.10 Exports of Ivorian cocoa have been disrupted in 
the last two years by attempts to withhold beans to raise 
prices. Export figures are not yet available for the last 
two years, but they are expected to show a substantial 
decline for the 1989/90 season. 1980 to 1988 exports are 
shown in figure 5. 
Quality 
4.11 Quality is a subjective issue. The market may 
reward particular origins with a premium (eg. the London 
market premium for cocoa from Ghana) but this can be due to 
a particular preference for the taste (le "gofit anglais" -
the English taste - as the French refer to it) rather than 
because of a reduction in impurities or higher fat content, 
for example. Ivorian cocoa is accepted as the industry 
standard grade, partly because it constitutes such a large 
part of total world output and partly because of its quality 
is considered to be good, although inferior to Ghana and 
Cameroon origins, whilst comprehensively better than 
Malaysia and Indonesia origins. 
4.12 So far as objective measures of quality go, the 
most important problem faced by Cote d'Ivoire producers is 
the lack of sample consistency. This leads to Ivorian cocoa 
being discounted by £15 to £30 per tonne on the London 
physical market. In principle, this could be handled by the 
exporters themselves through better grading. 
4.13 Wider quality issues, such as the reduction in 
moisture content, increased fat content, lower acidity and 
other market favoured attributes are long term concerns 
which most producing countries, Cote d'Ivoire included, look 
at in their long term industry development strategies. 
Cocoa vs. coffee 
4.14 On the Cote d'Ivoire, cocoa and coffee are often 
in competition for the same labour resources. Cocoa growers 
will usually possess coffee trees and coffee growers cocoa 
trees. The interaction of the two crops therefore has some 
impact on output. 
4.15 The price advantage of coffee over cocoa 
disappeared in the mid 1970s and today their prices are 
roughly the same16 • However, cocoa requires a lower 
management input, with a much lower weeding requirement than 
16) See figure 6, which allows for a conversion rate from 
dried coffee cherries to green bean coffee of 50% (2 kgs 
cherry= 1 kg green bean). This is then comparable with the 
price of dry bean cocoa. 
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coffee17 • Thus, for the same yield, cocoa has a higher 
return to labour than coffee (see figure 25). It is 
estimated that coffee prices would have to increase to a 
level 1.25 to 1.5 times that of cocoa before the relative 
advantages of cocoa are eclipsed and the balance begins to 
shift towards coffee18 , with commensurate increases in 
coffee yields. 
Research 
4.16 Cocoa research on the Cote d'Ivoire is handled by 
the IRCC19 , whose head office is at Bingerville, just 
outside Abidjan. In 1988, the IRCC was funded by the Cote 
d'Ivoire government (55%), by CIRAD (3%) and by sales of 
products and services (42%). Emphasis is being placed on 
breeding programmes designed to increase productivity by 
increasing yields and reducing disease susceptibilities. 
Agronomic factors, including nursery developments, plant 
spacing, rehabilitation and fertiliser recommendations are 
also receiving attention. On entomological issues, the main 
work is on mirid pests and in plant pathology work 
concentrates on the fungal disease black pod. Technological 
developments are taking place on solar drying of cocoa. 
4.17 As research funds are drawn partly from sales of 
cocoa and coffee produced on the IRCC's experimental 
stations, declining world prices have reduced funds 
available for research. Thus, in absolute terms, there will 
have to be a reduction of research effort, which may mean 
that speculative projects cannot be funded through 
established sources. 
4.18 Although there are no serious quality problems 
associated with Ivorian cocoa, there may still be 
opportunities for raising the technical standard of cocoa 
beans through post harvest work. At IRCC work has been 
conducted on the fermentation and drying process, including 
testing the techniques of cutting the bean before 
fermentation and delayed solar drying20 • Neither have proved 
very effective to date. Elsewhere attempts are being made 
to reduce the labour input, especially in designing and 
perfecting mechanical podders. Current Brazilian models do 
not perform to specification. 
4.19 Various chemical assays are being conducted by 
IRCC in conjunction with CIRAD at Montpellier, including: 
the influence of fermentation and roasting on the 
percentage of pyrazine in cocoa beans; 
17) Mainly due to the relative canopy size of the two 
trees. 
18) ADB coffee sub-sector review; robusta coffee. ADB, 
1990. 
19) Institut de recherche du cafe et du cacao 
20) Where beans are left in the shade for varying amounts 
of time after fermentation to try to develop the taste. 
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the effect of enzymes on fermentation times of cocoa; 
the effect of different agronomic practices on the 
quality of cocoa fat; 
the effect of roasting on chocolate aromas and volatile 
compounds. 
4.20 It is the role of SATMACI21 to extend the 
technological and management developments produced by IRCC. 
Although the director of SATMACI believes that the main 
problem for cocoa (and coffee) growers is the low price and 
the lack of alternative cash crops, the focus of effort has 
been on the extension of intensive management practices to 
growers, including the distribution of the new higher 
yielding hybrids. This exhortation to intensify has led 
some to criticise SATMACI and the IRCC for not being 
reconciled to the needs of the small farmer. 
21) SATMACI - La Societe d'Assistance Technique pour la 
Modenisation Agricole de la Cote d'Ivoire. 
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5. The Ivorian coffee industry 
Production 
5.01 Cote d'Ivoire was once the world largest producer 
of robusta coffee. In recent years, though, growth rates 
have declined and Cote d'Ivoire is now the third largest 
robusta coffee producer, behind Indonesia and Uganda. 
5.02 Coffee, like cocoa, has played a fundamental part 
in the economic development of Cote d'Ivoire. Production 
was encouraged in the sixties and 1970s with the opening up 
of the virgin forest lands, and the area planted to coffee 
grew steadily (see figure 7). Through the activities of the 
Caisse, substantial investment surpluses were generated, and 
as late as the early 1980s, coffee was providing 9% of 
government revenueaz. 
5.03 As Cote d'Ivoire diversified its production base 
and as coffee yields declined furthera 3 , the role of coffee 
in the Ivorian economy also declined. Now coffee accounts 
for less than 2% of GNP, down from 8% in the late 1960s and 
5% at the start of the 1980s. The absolute fall in the 
world coffee price occasioned by the end of quotas has 
played its part in this reduction. But equally strong 
forces within the Ivorian coffee sector have also had an 
impact. 
5.04 There are an estimated 390,000 coffee growing 
families on the Cote d'Ivoire. Within these families, the 
responsibility for coffee production tends to reside with 
men, although women and children take part in the harvest 
and maintenance of plots. Together, these families far.m 1.4 
million hectares of coffee, of which 1.2 million hectares is 
thought to be productive. Over 90% of holdings are less 
than 10 hectares, with 25% less than 2 hectares and 71% less 
than 5 hectaresa•. To all intents and purposes, therefore, 
coffee production, like cocoa production, is overwhelmingly 
a smallholder occupation. 
5.05 A characteristic of the Ivorian coffee sector is 
the venerable nature of the majority of the country's coffee 
treesas. Whilst 57% of cocoa trees were planted after 1970, 
only 37% of coffee trees are of this vintage. Indeed, over 
a quarter of all coffee trees were planted before 1960. 
5.06 Partly due to the age of the tree population, and 
partly due to labour shortages and relative land abundance, 
coffee production on the Cote d'Ivoire is an extensive 
activity; the use of fertilisers, sprays, etc. is very 
22) ADB, op.cit. 
23) See figure 9 
24) ADB, 1990. op.cit. 
25) The economic life of a tree is around 25 years, with 
yields dropping off quite quickly after the 6th or 7th year, 
levelling off around the tenth. See fig 10. 
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limited. Development was achieved through area expansion 
rather than rehabilitation or intensification. 
5.07 Figure 8 shows how production of coffee on the 
Cote d'Ivoire has developed over the past thirty years. 
Expansion of area into the virgin rain forest zones 
accounted for the initial development, and good soils helped 
to sustain production. Now, however, production appears to 
be settling down to a lower level. With minimal use of 
fertilisers, yields will continue to decline in line with 
soil fertility. Though production has fallen off noticeably 
in the last three years in response to the fall in 
international robusta prices, it is clear from figure 9 that 
yields on the Cote d'Ivoire have been falling steadily for 
the last twenty years. 
5.08 The redevelopment of the Ivorian coffee industry 
will require a substantial injection of effort. To replant 
all the areas where coffee trees have become senile would 
require the use of 238 million young plants per year over 
the next five years. Yet the estimated 1989 production of 
young plants was only 60 million. 
5.09 Coffee production costs were calculated for Cote 
d'Ivoire by the World Bank in 1986. An updated version 
appears in table 1. Traditional production methods using 
unimproved varieties and minimal management show a return 
per manday of under 1,000 CFA. The World Bank also 
established that a return per manday of just over 1,000 CFA 
was possible given the use of improved varieties (together 
with a low labour input regime). 
5.10 A study of the extension policy of SATMACI by 
Ruf2' has indicated that the tendency towards low input 
coffee farming has a sound economic basis. Ruf has shown 
that, except on the youngest plantations, returns to labour 
are such that the most efficient27 regime involves just one 
weeding session per growing season. Yet, in an attempt to 
reverse the stagnation of the industry, Cote d'Ivoire 
extension policy encourages growers to weed up to four times 
per season. There is evidence that 2 to 3 weeding sessions 
may be appropriate on the very youngest plantations (four to 
10 years) but on plantations over 10 years old, one, and at 
most two weeding sessions correspond with rational economic 
behaviour on the part of the smallholder. 
Marketing 
5.11 The robusta coffee harvest on the Cote d'Ivoire 
lasts from November to April, coinciding to some extent with 
the cocoa harvest (October to February). After strip-
26) Le cafe et les risques de !'intensification - Cas de la 
Cote d'Ivoire et du Toga Ruf, F et Ruf, T in Milleuille et 
Eloin Le risque en agriculture ORSTOM, 1989. 
27) ie. economically efficient 
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picking28 the coffee, growers dry the coffee cherries in the 
sun. This takes from 10 to 14 days. The dried cherry is 
then bought at the fixed Caisse price25 - announced in 
advance of the harvest each year - by private traders, many 
of whom also purchase cocoa. The traders act on behalf of 
200 or so licensed buyers, most of whom operate in turn on 
behalf of the 34 licensed exporters. In addition to the 
private traders, there are around 2,000 co-operatives who 
also buy coffee. 
5.12 As is the case with cocoa, traders do not only buy 
the crop, they also provide growers with other services, 
particularly credit. And as is the case for cocoa, traders 
are believed to manipulate credit arrangements to 
effectively pay illegal low prices for coffee. 
5.13 Up to the end of the 1970s, growers would hull30 
the coffee on the farm. Since then, centralised hulling 
factories have been set up, raising the recovery rate of 
cherry to green bean from 47% to 52%. There are 16 hulling 
plants situated around the country (15 of which are owned by 
the exporters themselves), and the coffee traders deliver 
their purchases direct to these plants. From here, the 
unsorted green bean coffee is delivered to the exporters 
where it is sorted to remove impurities, and graded. 
5.14 Caisse determined prices are set in precisely the 
same way for both coffee and cocoa. An export price is set 
each year, and fixed deductions are made for the various 
marketing services to arrive at a grower price. Thus, the 
exporter has no formal control over the per-unit profit. In 
effect, the exporter is merely an agent for the Caisae. 
5.15 In an attempt to maintain grower prices, the 
Caisse has recently made arbitrary reductions in the fixed 
margins it allows exporters, buyers and processors. In the 
past four years, these margins have consistently failed to 
reflect the rise in the cost of living and, after showing 
considerable resilience, many exporters are now in financial 
trouble. 
5.16 The main export markets for Ivorian coffee are the 
countries of the European Community. Italy now represents 
the largest market, with the Netherlands and the USA also 
important. 
Quality 
5.17 There are a variety of views on the definition of 
"quality" in coffee. It is common to declare that robusta 
coffee is of a "lower quality" than arabica, using the 
28) A technique whereby all the coffee is picked at one 
time, regardless of the maturity of many of the cherries. 
29) see figure 6 
30) Hulling involves the removal of the dried cherry to 
leave the green bean. 
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market premium for arabica coffees as evidence. However, 
this is a simplistic view; the two products are really 
separate. The quality of any particular robusta coffee 
should be discussed in relation to other robusta coffees, 
rather than in relation to arabicas. 
5.18 The most commonly used parameters of quality in 
robusta coffee samples are size of bean and absence of 
defects and impurities. In general, the taste or flavour of 
robusta coffees cannot be used to characterise quality, as 
different markets prefer different taste profiles. There 
are accepted "off" characteristics which all markets 
discount, but mild robustas, such as those produced in Togo, 
and harsh robustas, such as those produced on the Cote 
d'Ivoire, appeal to different markets31 • 
5.19 The quality of Ivorian coffee has become a major 
source of concern to the industry over the last ten years. 
The causes of low quality are usually concerned with poor 
growing conditions, age of trees and post harvest handling. 
The problem is manifested in the apparent reduction of grade 
1 exports from Cote d'Ivoire in the last few years32 • 
5.20 Small bean size in Ivorian robusta is caused by 
(1) the apparent lack of water during the important growing 
phase of the cherry in July and August33 , (2) excessive age 
of trees, and (3) premature harvesting. Since there is very 
little which can be done in the short term about the 
provision of irrigation and the age of coffee trees, the 
only feasible short term response is to ensure that correct 
harvesting is carried out. 
5.21 The improper conduct of harvesting is similarly 
culpable in producing "black beans", beans which possess a 
brown or dark brown appearance and which can only be sold at 
a substantial discount. Figure 11 shows that the rate of 
black beans has exceeded 10% on 5 occasions in the 1980s, 
and although figures are not available for the end of the 
decade, IRCC sources state that the rate has increased. The 
average figure masks the fact that, in some areas the 
proportion is approaching 25%. In general, the "black beans" 
have to be sorted from the sample before export. So great 
is the production of "black beans" on the Cote d'Ivoire that 
there is evidence to suggest that there are over 1 million 
bags of outgraded and all-but unsaleable coffee currently in 
store in Abidjan. 
31) For example, the French and Italians have a preference 
for the harsher robusta quality of Ivorian robusta whilst 
the British and German markets prefer a milder version, such 
as those produced in Togo and in Uganda. 
32) See for example "Note sur la qualite du cafe en Cote 
d'Ivoire" Direction et controle des grands traveaux, August 
1989. 
33) A phenomenon which is said to be growing as West Africa 
becomes drier with climatic change. 
17 
5.22 The physical cause of "black beans" is the 
harvesting of immature (green or yellow) and over-mature 
cherries, a characteristic of the strip-picking system. 
Three factors dispose Ivorian growers towards this system of 
harvesting coffee: first; the high cost of labour relative 
to both value of output and total production costs, second; 
the absence of any premium for good quality harvesting, and 
third; the difficulty of identifying quality in dry 
cherryH. 
5.23 Another strong incentive to pick immature coffee 
cherries is the need for immediate cash funds in the 
September/October period when school fees become payable. 
To support this contention, when the buying season was 
delayed by public decree in 1987 there was a marked 
reduction in the incidence of black beans35 • 
5.24 An additional and equally important cause of black 
beans is poor drying of the cherry, usually occasioned by 
drying on soil. Technically, the use of black plastic 
sheeting has been advocated as an appropriate response to 
this problem, but, again, investment in this technique is 
ill-advised if inadequate recompense is awarded through the 
market price. Improperly dried cherry can also result in 
mal-fermented beans, known as "stinkers", whose execrable 
flavour will ruin a sample. 
5.25 The plethora of recommendations for changing the 
"one price" system of buying to accommodate a premium 
resulted in a major policy change for the 1990-91 season. 
During this season, a 12% premium is being paid for good 
quality coffee36 , with a 0.12% discount for each 1% of black 
beans included, corresponding to a 12% reduction for a 
sample of 100% black beans. 
5.26 However, in practice it is difficult to identify 
quality differences at the dry cherry stage. Furthermore, 
the 12% premium is probably inadequate for the additional 
labour required to harvest selectively and the 0.12% 
discount for black beans is modest. For these reasons, some 
observers of the Ivorian coffee industry believe that the 
scheme will have a marginal impact. 
5.27 In conclusion, the poor quality of Cote d'Ivoire 
robusta coffee is caused not by lack of technical know how 
on the part of the grower but by a lack of economic 
incentive to improve the situation. 
34) Although moisture content can be easily assessed at the 
dry cherry stage, it is difficult to assess the proportion 
of outgrades until the coffee is hulled and the green bean 
is produced. 
3 5 ) ADB , 19 9 0 • 
36) Defined as 
Ledger, 1.2.91 
quality" 
op.cit. 
coffee free from black beans. See Public 
pg 1. "Cote d'Ivoire moves to raise coffee 
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Cocoa vs. Coffee 
5.28 Section 3.15 states that returns per man day for 
coffee production on the Cote d'Ivoire compare unfavourable 
with those from cocoa; this is corroborated by table 1. As 
cocoa is usually a direct alternative to coffee, the 
development of the Ivorian robusta coffee industry is 
fundamentally constrained by movements in the relative price 
of coffee and cocoa. This emphasises the point that the 
Ivorian grower operates within the confines of a farming 
system where there are both complementary and competing 
calls on labour. 
Research 
5.30 Coffee research is conducted on the Cote d'Ivoire 
by the IRCC. IRCC's most celebrated development has been 
"arabusta", a cross between arabica and robusta which 
combines the agronomic advantages of robusta (suitability in 
low altitude areas) with the market qualities of arabica 
(large bean size, preferred aroma, lower caffeine content). 
So far, pest and disease susceptibility and the relative 
labour intensity of production37 have limited the adoption 
of the cross by the Ivorian grower. 
5.31 Other research interests include the development 
of improved robusta varieties, applied research on 
management problems (spacing, the effect of fertilisers and 
the control of pests) and investigation of the effect of 
different harvest practices on yield. However, the director 
of IRCC has pointed out that the basic techniques for 
improving yield and quality of output are well understood by 
the grower; the problem is that the grower has no economic 
incentive to use the techniques. 
37) Particularly the need to wet process. 
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6. Toga 
6.01 Togo has a population of around 3.25 million, the 
majority of whom earn their living from agriculture. Per 
capita income is $300 per annum, although rural incomes are 
only one-third of this level38 • In the 1960s, annual growth 
rates of 7% were achieved, thanks mainly to exports of high 
quality phosphates. These rates were amongst the highest in 
Africa. However, classic expansion of the public sector led 
to debt problems in the 1970s, and IMF financial 
stabilisation and adjustment programmes were introduced in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s to remedy the situation. 
6.02 Agriculture accounts for 30% of Togolese GDP and 
export revenue. Cotton, coffee and cocoa are the most 
important export crops, each contributing around 10% of 
export earnings. Domestic food production makes the country 
self-sufficient in clement years, but in the 1980s 
production of food crops has failed, in common with much of 
sub-saharan Africa, to keep pace with population growth. 
With the exception of cotton and coffee, production of cash 
crops has fallen. Whilst Toga has suffered from climatic 
shocks, particularly the drought of 1981-82, this does not 
help to explain the poor performance of the agricultural 
sector. World Bank observers insist that the reason for the 
disappointing performance is that support for farmers, in 
terms of extension and prices, has been inadequate. To 
address these problems, the Bank lent substantial funds to 
Togo in the 1980s. 
6.03 Togo operates the same monetary system as Cote 
d•rvoire, linked to the french franc via the CFA. There are 
other similarities between the two economies. A parastatal 
- the Office des Produits Agricoles du Togo (OPAT) - is 
responsible for the purchase and export of cotton, cocoa, 
coffee, palm oil and groundnuts, and for the stabilisation 
of producer prices for these commodities39 • In exactly the 
same way as the Caisse de Stabilisation on the Cote 
d•rvoire, OPAT also sets margins of marketing intermediaries 
and provides funds from retained "surpluses" for state 
investment. 
6.04 Under both local and expatriate planters, 
production of cocoa and coffee began early in Togo. The 
main production districts were Kloto, Akposso and Litime in 
the south-west. At the start of the 1970s it was apparent 
that a major rehabilitation and replanting exercise was 
necessary to modernise the beverage crop sector. Further 
impetus for a redevelopment was provided by the relative 
lack of prosperity of coffee and cocoa farmers in post 
independence Toga. 
6.05 Due to the weakness of central government 
institutions, an independent project unit - the Societe 
38) World Bank, 1988. Staff appraisal report, cotton 
sector development project, May 31, 1988. 
39) Although there is no official stabilisation fund. 
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Nationale pour la Renovati.on et Developpement de la 
Cacaoye.re et de la Cafeiere Togolaise ( SR.CC) - was 
established to manage development. SR.CC now handles 
extension, applied research, input sup.ply, seed production, 
marketing and road construction/ maintenance. The IR.CC, 
based at Kpalime, handles both basic and applied research. 
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7. The Togolese cocoa industry 
Production 
7.01 Cocoa production is concentrated in the Plateau 
region of western Toga, particularly the Litime and Kloto 
plains. Cocoa has been established in these areas for many 
years, in contrast to coffee. To illustrate this, whilst 
only 6% of today's coffee area was under coffee in 1950, 
over one third of todays cocoa had already been planted. 
Favourable conditions, including historically high world 
prices in the mid-fifties and the establishment of a cocoa 
marketing board in Ghana40 , further encouraged Togolese 
cocoa production. 
7.02 Between the mid 1960s and 1970s, cocoa production 
declined due to the impact of the disease swollen shoot and 
various mirid pests. In 1971 FAC41 assisted in a cocoa 
development programme which was followed up with the first 
of several IDA42 backed cash crop development projects. The 
objectives of the development programmes included the 
planting of over 4,000 hectares of cocoa trees, the 
strengthening of extension services and the establishment of 
applied research programmes at IRCC. 
7.03 Cocoa redevelopment efforts had a disappointing 
impact in comparison with those for coffee. According to 
Bank evaluations, poor replanting techniques, inadequate 
financial incentives and land tenure problems accounted for 
this failure. In addition, the success of the coffee 
development programme lead those growers for whom coffee was 
a viable agronomic alternative to switch from cocoa to 
robusta coffee. As a consequence, cocoa production became 
more extensive and the output of cocoa began to fall, as 
demonstrated in figure 12. 
7.04 The total area planted to cocoa in Toga is 
estimated to be 35,000 hectares43 with an average size of 
holding of four hectares. Due to the extensive nature of 
production, median yields are low, at 150 to 200 kg per 
hectare44 • Figure 12 shows that production has fallen 
steadily since the early 1970s; after reaching a peak of 
30,000 tonnes in 1972, production declined to 8,700 tonnes 
in 1989. With the reduced management input which 
accompanies low grower prices, early recovery of output is 
unlikely. 
40) The Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board paid a fixed price, 
protecting growers from world price fluctuations. The 
permeability of the Togo/Ghana border meant that Togolese 
growers could take advantage of this development. 
41) Fends d'Aide et de la Cooperation; a French aid agency 
42) International Development Administration of the World 
Bank 
43) 
44) 
and 
Rapport Final d'Execution SRCC II, December 1987. 
World Bank, 1986. Staff appraisal report, third coffee 
cocoa development project. 
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7.05 After the initial IDA funded programme (1974), a 
second cocoa and coffee industry project was undertaken in 
1979, providing for the development of a further 7,500 
hectares of coffee and 4,000 hectares of cocoa. Once again, 
however, cocoa performance was weak. In 1986, the programme 
evaluation estimated that only 20% of the replanted area 
would yield "satisfactory" results. So poor were the 
results that a mid-term review was called for which revised 
objectives downwards, placing additional emphasis on capsid 
and black pod control programmes. 
7.06 The first two coffee and cocoa development 
initiatives, both backed by the IDA, had succeeded in 
replanting only a small percentage of the cocoa area; 2,600 
hectares out of a total area of over 35,000 hectares, 
leaving a senile population of under-productive trees. 
Thus, a further phase (III) of the project was proposed in 
1986. This time, emphasis was placed on the intensification 
of production, as it became clear that mere extension of 
area was not having the desired effect and was stretching 
the resources of the extension service. 
7.07 The third phase of the SRCC project will be 
completed in 1991. Plans are already being made for a 
fourth phase, but the indications from the World Bank office 
in Lame are that further IDA involvement is unlikely. 
Marketing 
7.08 Primary marketing is controlled by licensed 
traders45 • Seventy percent of this market is accounted for 
by a joint government and private operation; the societe 
pour le commerce des produits (STCP). All cocoa, once 
purchased, is delivered to OPAT. As on the Cote d'Ivoire, 
marketing of cocoa is managed by a single parastatal 
enterprise which regulates prices and manages exports. In 
the past, notoriously large losses were made in "pre-
financing" arrangementsu between OPAT and the traders, and 
between the traders and a host of smaller sub-traders. This 
pushed up the costs of marketing, as these costs were 
ultimately borne by the grower. Today, pre-financing is no 
longer officially practiced. 
7.09 Like the Caisse on the Cote d'Ivoire, OPAT 
effectively taxed the grower heavily when world prices were 
high. Figure 13 (and 24) show how, in the late 1970s and 
mid 1980s, a substantial differential between grower and FOB 
prices was maintained. In 1978 and 1979, when FOB prices 
were BOO CFA per kilo, growers were paid 200 CFA at the farm 
gate47 • However, in the late 1980s, as world prices began 
45) As in Cote d'Ivoire, there is a disproportionate amount 
of Lebanese involved at this stage of the marketing chain. 
46) Whereby OPAT would provide money to the traders before 
produce had actually been purchased from the growers. 
47) World Bank figures (1986) suggest per tonne marketing 
costs of 120 CFA per tonne for cocoa, including commission, 
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to fall back to their lowest-ever levels, OPAT was obliged 
to cut these implicit tax rates. Today, with grower prices 
at 225 CFA per kilo and FOB prices at below 500, effective 
tax rates are lower4B. 
7.10 The similarity between the Caisse and OPAT extends 
to the inflexible pricing system. The same price is paid to 
growers for the whole year in every area of the country. 
Thus, as is the case in the Cote d'Ivoire, no allowance is 
made for the cost of transport from remote areas and no 
allowance is made for quality. Growers in accessible areas 
therefore subsidise growers in inaccessible areas. Figure 
14 shows the evolution of grower prices (in real terms) over 
the last thirty years, with the late 1980s price falls 
highly visible. 
7.11 The main markets for Togolese cocoa are the Soviet 
Union, Germany and, to a lesser extent, France49 • Figure 15 
shows Toga cocoa exports declining in line with falls in 
production over the same period, though with markedly 
greater variability. 
Quality 
7.12 Due to the similarity of growing conditions and 
growing practices50 , Togolese farmers produce cocoa of a 
comparable quality to that from Ghana - acknowledged to be 
the finest amongst mass-produced cocoas. In principle, 
therefore, Toga should be in a position to sell its cocoa at 
premium prices. In practice, with the main buyer being the 
Soviet Union, Toga has failed to establish itself firmly as 
a top quality producer. There are suspicions that this is 
due more to lack of marketing acumen than to poor intrinsic 
product quality, and this is reflected by the general lack 
of concern being shown by both the SRCC and the IRCC about 
cocoa quality, such that no official quality improvement 
work is now being performed. 
transport and taxes. Therefore the effective tax on 
Togolese growers was over 60% in the late 1970s and around 
70% in 1985. 
48) OPAT would argue that there is now no tax on growers, 
or, indeed, that subsidies are being paid. In practice, 
however, the high cost of OPAT administration and the lack 
of competition amongst the licensed buyers, who have their 
margins determined for them by OPAT, means that the grower 
is still paying an implicit tax to subsidise these 
inefficiencies. 
49) 1988/89 import figures for Togolese cocoa; USSR 5004 
tonnes (1989/90), Germany 2012 and France 626. (ICCO 
figures.) 
50) Established early in the century when the borders of 
the two countries were more permeable. 
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Research 
7.13 This relative lack of concern about quality is 
manifested in the research programme of the IRCC. Whilst 
there has been a small programme looking at differing 
chemical properties of cocoa butter from different cocoa 
clones, the emphasis of the research programme for cocoa is 
on developing higher yielding varieties, investigating 
agronomic practices, developing controls for pests, viruses 
and rots and improving water management where long dry 
seasons occur. Undoubtedly, there will be quality spin-offs 
from some of these programmes, particularly the control of 
black pod, but the basic focus is on intensification of 
production. 
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8. The Togolese coffee industry 
Production 
8.01 There are two types of coffee produced in Toga, 
both of which are varieties of coffea canephora; niaouli and 
robusta. Naiouli is an obsolete variety which is no longer 
systematically managed by growers, having been abandoned due 
to feeble yields caused largely by scolyte attack. Robusta 
is the major commercial variety now grown in Toga, and has 
formed the basis of developments in the industry over the 
last fifteen years. 
8.02 Figure 16 illustrates the relative increase in 
productive area of robusta and the parallel decline in the 
area of niaouli during the 1980s. Production fiqures over 
the same period (see figure 17) show that this change in 
area is mirrored in the output figures. Combining area and 
output figures produces estimates of yield per hectare; 
figure 18 shows how yields for niaouli and robusta differ, 
with returns averaging 600 kg per hectare for the recently 
planted robustas and as little as 50 kg per hectare for the 
unmanaged, vintage niaoulis. 
8.03 The majority of coffee plantations are located in 
the plateau region of south west Toga - Klouto, Kpalime and 
Atakpame. Total area is around 50,000 hectares and holding 
size is typically small; usually less than 1 hectare per 
family. Production of coffee peaked in the late 1960s at 
17,000 tonnes (see figure 19), but fell back in the 1970s 
and early 1980s due to the dearth of improved planting 
material and complementary agronomic advice, and due to the 
low prices paid to growers over the period. 
8.04 In order to retrieve the situation, SRCC was given 
the responsibility for redeveloping the sector. From the 
beginning, the SRCC peddled the principle of intensive 
management. SRCC operated a highly disciplined and 
energetic coffee extension system. Zealous extension 
workers employed by the SRCC advocated management consisting 
of up to five weeding sessions per coffee year for project 
areas. Any growers who were not providing this level of 
management input could be penalised through the twin 
sanctions of withdrawing credit opportunities and preventing 
access to new planting material. Thus, if the grower wanted 
to stay on the SRCC programme (and benefit from credit 
provision, seedling distribution, extension advice and so 
on) he or she would be obliged to follow the management 
strictures of the programme. 
8.05 The initial success of SRCC was based on the 
production and area increases outlined in figure 19. 
Subsequent analysis by Ruf and Ruf 51 shows that the highest 
yields (approaching 1,200 kgs per hectares in some cases) 
51) Le cafe et les risques de !'intensification- Cas de la 
Cote d'Ivoire et du Toga Ruf, F et Ruf, Tin Milleuille et 
Eloin Le risque en agriculture ORSTOM, 1989. 
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are obtained in the youngest (five to eight years old) 
plantations. Older plantations returned lower yields of 
under 800 kg per hectare. Ruf and Ruf observed that, during 
the first years of production, growers indulge in intensive 
management to produce maximum yields but subsequently relax 
their management input and produce lower yields. This 
pattern of behaviour is shown by Ruf and Ruf to be 
economically rational. The indubitable increase in yields 
from more intensive management has to be compared to 
alternative earning possibilities. The typical yield 
profile of a coffee tree shows strong production from years 
five to eight (see figure 10), during which time it responds 
vigorously to intensive management. However, as the tree 
ages, so it responds less well to intensification. Figure 
20 summarises the position, illustrating the low marginal 
product of labour for old coffee trees. Thus, in early 
years the yield increase from intensive management is 
considered to be such as to justify the use of additional 
labour, but as the marginal product of labour declines, so 
too does the attractiveness of the intensive options2 • 
Marketing 
8.06 The marketing of coffee is identical to that of 
cocoa. The same traders handle the two crops and pass the 
produce on to OPAT, who have sole authority to export 
Togolese coffee. Prices are set by reference to the same 
"bareme" 53 method, with the marketing margin on coffee 
currently set at around 100 CFA per kilo. Figure 21 shows 
the difference between grower and FOB prices over the last 
fifteen years. Again, the picture is very similar to that 
of cocoa, exhibiting, if anything, even higher effective 
rates of taxation in the 1977 and 1984-86 period. World 
Bank figures bear this out, indicating that in 1977, 
Togolese growers received just 11% of the FOB price for 
their coffee (see figure 24). In recent years, the collapse 
of world prices has resulted in the further decline of farm 
gate prices. Figure 22 shows that real grower prices are at 
their lowest for over thirty years. 
8.07 The principle export markets for Togolese coffee 
are the Netherlands, France and Germany. Exports over the 
last ten years have increased from eight thousand tonnes to 
14 thousand (see figure 23). 
52) The same phenomenon also explains the SRCC policy of 
tying improved plant and credit availability to intensive 
management, since without this additional incentive, the 
grower may choose to manage coffee extensively. 
53) Literally "scale", the fixed margins which OPAT 
calculates for marketing costs. 
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Coffee vs. cocoa 
8.08 On the Cote d'Ivoire, cocoa and coffee are grown 
in roughly the same areas. The relative profitability of 
cocoa in relation to coffee means that growers who increase 
their management (ie labour) input to cocoa would, as a 
result, tend to reduce their output of coffee. In Toga, 
where this geographic coincidence of coffee and cocoa 
production is not so marked, the profit advantage of cocoa 
over coffee does not have the same impact on coffee output. 
8.09 Indeed, in Toga the picture is almost the exact 
reverse of that in Ivory Coast (compare figures 24 and 25). 
Whereas on the Cote d'Ivoire cocoa output has grown to 
outstrip coffee output, in Toga the converse has occurred. 
The main reason for this relative success of coffee over 
cocoa is the novelty of the robusta coffee crop. The 
marginal improvement of the new improved robustas over the 
old niaoulis was so dramatic that growers were encouraged to 
adopt the new varieties. Simultaneously, the SRCC was 
charged with the responsibility of developing the coffee 
sector. With the effective new varieties, plus the high 
prices of the late 1970s and the additional attractions of 
credit and other inputs, growers seem to have given a 
favourable response to SRCC attempts to increase coffee 
output. As the new varieties began to produce commercial 
yields around the start of the 1980s so output has 
increased. 
8.10 Cocoa, on the other hand, suffered from being an 
established crop. Technical improvements offered by the 
SRCC showed only marginal improvements over more traditional 
varieties, and exhortation to replant fell on deaf ears at a 
time when world cocoa prices were strong. In addition, 
replanting techniques were felt to be inappropriate. 
8.11 The argument that cocoa production improvements 
failed due to the low price structure are questionable, 
since, if anything, coffee producers seem to have been more 
harshly treated by the state. 
Quality 
8.12 Togolese coffee is considered to be of relatively 
good quality; it has a mild flavour which is valued by the 
market and grading and sorting are carried out to a high 
standard. Also, the young age of the majority of Togolese 
trees ensures that bean size is usually acceptable. SRCC is 
responsible for monitoring harvesting and immediate post-
harvest activities. It seems that in this area, as in 
others, the SRCC has been able to minimise poor management 
practice such as strip picking which has had such a 
detrimental effect on Ivorian coffee production. According 
to the SRCC 1989 annual report, outgrades amounted to only 
3% of the total harvest. 
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8.13 The high standard of Togolese robusta has not lead 
to nonchalance about further quality improvements (see 
section 7.16) on the part of researchers. Unfortunately, 
such developments are frustrated by the price system which 
offers no premium for good quality. 
8.14 As on the Cote d'Ivoire, progressive analysts of 
the coffee industry in Togo believe that reform of the price 
system is the prerequisite for further improvement in 
quality. However, at the moment Togolese coffees suffer 
less from price distortions than do Ivorian coffees because 
of the relative efficiency of the SRCC in promoting good 
standards of harvest and post harvest management. 
Research 
8.15 With a relatively young (robusta) coffee industry, 
the emphasis of Togo coffee research is still on the 
development of high yielding varieties and complementary 
agronomic practices (fertilisation, water conservation, 
etc.). Given the strong links between research and 
extension, enshrined in the design of the SRCC, much effort 
is also allocated to "management" of coffee, particularly 
the question of frequency of management tasks. 
8.16 Nonetheless, in the three year plan from 1989-91, 
the Togolese Scientific Ministry has sanctioned a research 
programme looking at Togolese coffee quality. This 
programme is essentially concerned with evaluating "wet 
processing" technology for Togolese robusta54 • A mechanical 
plant has already been set up in Kpalime. The first year's 
output has been sent to Montpelier for organoleptic tests 
and to various exporters for assessment of the price 
(premiums) payable. Results are not yet available. 
8.17 Some problems have been encountered with the 
washing programme, particularly in connection with access to 
water and disposal of the exceptionally high BOD55 coffee 
pulp effluent. Currently IRCC is trying to let the effluent 
evaporate away, but this is not likely to be practical for 
commercial scale enterprises. In some countries the 
increasing severity of environmental control legislation 
threatens to have a major impact on coffee processing. 
54) Robusta, due to its low value, is usually dry 
processed. The cherry is sundried for up to two weeks. A 
mechanical grinder is then employed to remove the dried 
cherry. This system has the advantage of being cheap, but 
the disadvantage of imparting discolouration to the green 
bean. The wet processing system, where the cherry pulp is 
removed (usually with a hand driven pulping device) and then 
dried, produces a cleaner green bean. It also allows a more 
predictable fermentation of the bean and facilitates the 
removal of poor quality beans at the farm gate. 
55) Biological Oxygen Demand 
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8.18 There is a possibility that the World Bank will 
not agree to ;finance the fourth phase of the SRCC programme. 
If that happens, there is likely to be a shortage of 
research funds over the next five years. 
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